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Abstract
WTO judges are proposed by the WTO Secretariat and elected to act as ‘judges’ if either approved by
the parties to a dispute, or by the WTO Director-General in case no agreement between the parties has
been possible. They are typically ‘Geneva crowd’, that is, they are either current or former delegates
representing their country before the WTO. This observation holds for both first- as well as second
instance WTO judges (e.g. Panelists and members of the Appellate Body). In that, the WTO evidences
an attitude strikingly similar to the GATT. Whereas the legal regime has been heavily ‘legalized’, the
people called to enforce it remain the same.

Keywords
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JEL Classification: K40

1. Introductory Remarks*
In his monumental study of 1993, Hudec made a very persuasive claim to the effect that the WTO
dispute settlement system did not transition to compulsory third party adjudication overnight. The
GATT started as a ‘relational contract’ among few, like-minded players. Years of pragmatic
judgments that followed, developed a trade ethos of respecting the agreed deeds, while deviations
would be tolerated in the short run.
The typical GATT Panelist would be a trade delegate usually present in Geneva when disputes
arose. The advent of the WTO has not changed this picture. Both Panelists, as well as members of the
Appellate Body (AB) are typically current or former national delegates. It is of course difficult to
‘measure’ the impact that similar profiles might have on the shaping of outcomes. It is quite telling
though, that whereas the WTO has been hailed as a departure from GATT’s pragmatism and the
beginning of a new era–namely ‘legalization’–it is the people who largely contributed to the shaping
of the GATT-era that are called to shape the new, changed image.
In Section 2, we discuss the identity and function of WTO ‘judges’, and their selection process. In
Section 3, we focus on the identity and role of clerks aiding them. It is in this Section where we
present our thoughts regarding the incentive structure of WTO judges to dedicate time and effort in
resolving disputes submitted before them. Section 4 recaps the main observations.

2. Appointing Judges at the WTO
2.1 Panelists
2.1.1 Nomination
According to the DSU:
(a) three Panelists will serve a Panel, unless parties agree to a Panel consisting of five Panelists (Art.
8.5);
(b) it is the WTO Secretariat that has the initiative to propose Panelists (8.6);
(c) it can propose Panelists from the indicative list (‘roster’) of Panelists which is kept at the WTO.
WTO Members that can propose individuals for inclusion in the list, which divides the roster
Panelists into ‘governmental’ and non-governmental (8.4);
(d) if the parties agree with the Panelists proposed by the Secretariat, then the Panel will be
established. Agreement of the parties is the sufficient condition to this effect. Nevertheless, if they
disagree with respect to one or more Panelists proposed, then the complainant or the defendant can
request from the Director-General (DG) of the WTO to establish or complete the Panel (8.7).
Disagreements with proposed names must be based on ‘compelling reasons’ (8.6);
(e) the right to request the DG to establish/complete the Panel cannot be exercised before 20 days
from the establishment of the Panel have lapsed, e.g. 20 days from the date when the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) has agreed to establish a Panel to adjudicate a particular dispute (8.7);
(f) the DG has discretion to establish the Panel. He must consult with the Chairmen of the DSB and
the competent committee, but does not have to follow their advice (8.7).

*

We would like to thank Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, Julie Pain, and Rhian-Mary Wood-Richards for graciously commenting
on previous drafts, and for spending time answering to our many questions.
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In practice, all Panels established in the WTO-era so far have been composed of three Panelists,
though a panel of five is an option.
The parties can reject the nomination of Panelists only for ‘compelling reasons’. Practice–which we
visit infra–suggests that requests to the DG to ‘complete’ the Panel happen very frequently. This
should mean that either ‘compelling reasons’ arise too often (and then maybe the legislator had
underestimated the frequency of occurrence), or that this term has been interpreted in a rather relaxed
manner.
It is very difficult to indulge any further in this area, which belongs to the sphere of private
information: proposals for Panelists take place behind closed doors. One thing is for sure. Nationality
emerges as one ‘compelling reason’. There is only one case–US-Zeroing (EC)–where nationals of a
litigating party served in a Panel. In this case, Bill Davey (US national) and Hans Beseler (German
national) served together as Panelists in a dispute between the EU and the US.1
The DG customarily meets not only with the two Chairmen (Dispute Settlement Body, General
Council), but also with the members of the WTO Legal Service, and/or Services or Rules Division (if
the case concerns trade in services, or contingent protection) when establishing the Panel. The DG has
to consult but does not need to agree with anyone when ‘composing’ the Panel. The DSU does not
include any ‘checks and balances’ regarding the manner in which the DG will perform his/her choice.
As a result, we can only go by ‘revealed preferences’ and observe the people that have eventually got
the nod.
2.1.2 Who Gets the Nod?
We provide our Panelists’ classification in order to facilitate the discussion and provide some
hopefully useful conclusions. We make a general division across Panelists depending on whether the
Panelists’ main employer is governmental or non-governmental. We further subdivide nongovernmental into academic or private practice. Finally, we check whether Panelists were or have
been a Geneva resident (a longer stay) at the time of their appointment, for both categories.
We thus, try to capture not only the nature of their link–if any–to a particular WTO Member but
also the nature of their link to the WTO. While we use employment as proxy for the former, we use
‘Geneva presence’ as proxy for the latter.
During the period 1995–2014 a total of 245 Panelists have served on 224 Panels. This number
(245) defines our sample. We have a dispute-Panelist dyad (or ‘Panel appointments’) of 672 (since
three Panelists serve on a Panel).
Only 30% of all Panelists have been chosen from the indicative list. Note though, that 77 Panelists
were not on the indicative list at the time of appointment, but were added on afterwards.
Around 60% of the total number (245), were in the service of their government at the time of their
appointment. This number needs correction though, as we detail in what immediately follows.
Non-governmental Panelists represent 40% of the total number, of which 25% were private sector
employees at the time of their appointment (mostly private consultants or lawyers in private practices),
whereas 15% were academics.
58% of the non-governmental Panelists have been formerly (e.g. before the time of their
appointment) in the service of their government. Were we to control for this number, then roughly
three quarters (74%) of all Panel appointments include government or former government officials.
1

This happens routinely though before the AB. In the GATT years, nationals did serve on occasion on Panels. Bob Hudec
for example, a US citizen, served as Panelist in US-Customs User Fee; Andy Lowenfeld (US), and Pierre Pescatore
(Luxembourg) served as Panelists in US-Section 337, a dispute between the EU and the US.
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Prior to their first Panel appointment, 66–76% of all Panelists had previously been in contact with
WTO in some capacity and/or were current residents in Geneva. This includes Panelists that took part
in GATT and its negotiations. We can only provide a range for this statistic, since it is unfortunately
more unreliable than employment at the time of appointment.2
What about the education of Panelists? We should state at the outset that the disclosure of personal
data is highly asymmetric across Panelists, and correcting through web search is not a perfect
substitute for official disclosures. We thus were unable to find out the educational background for 33%
of all Panelists.
With this caveat, we note that 40% of all Panels have had Panelists with a legal background, albeit
with various levels of legal education/law degree. 16% of all Panelists have an economics background,
the overwhelming majority being Economics majors in undergraduate studies, e.g. without a Master’s
or Ph.D. in economics. 12% of all Panelists have acquired other degrees, e.g. history, political science,
geography etc.
2.1.3 Remuneration
The DSU does not say much about remuneration of Panelists, other than (8.11):
Panelists' expenses, including travel and subsistence allowance, shall be met from the WTO
budget in accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on
recommendations of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
In practice, following an unofficial ‘memorandum’ dating from 1992, the following applies:

(a) governmental Panelists do not get reimbursed for Panel work. They will get reimbursed for
travelling, if they are not Geneva-based;
(b) non-governmental Panelists will get reimbursed 600CHF/day of work. They will also receive a
437CHF/day per diem to cover expenses incurred when participating in Panel hearings in Geneva.
Finally, they can request money for work done in preparation of meetings. In the overwhelming
majority of cases, anecdotal evidence suggests that they do not request honoraria for more than 10
days per dispute, paid at 600CHF/day.3
2.1.4 Function
Panels have standard terms of reference, unless if agreed otherwise by the parties to a dispute, namely
(Art. 7 DSU):
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by
the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to
make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in that/those agreement(s).

This is hardly a self-interpreting statement and it says nothing about sources of law they can use,
standard of review etc. One thing is clear: Panelists are ‘agents’ with a limited mandate; they are not
‘principals’. They must ensure the ‘policy space’ committed to the WTO by the ‘principals’, the WTO
Members. Art. 3.2 DSU reads to this effect:
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.

2

3

Unless they clearly state in their curriculum vitaes, official biographies or if they have or had employment as a WTO
delegate or similar it can’t be conclusively determined what kind contact they have had with Geneva in general, WTO in
particular. Undetermined are around 12% (78 panel appointments) for this variable.
The WTO is non-transparent in this respect, and the information we have included here is based on interviews with
former Panelists.

3

Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis

To this effect, they will issue ‘recommendations’ when a violation has been established, and may issue
‘suggestions’ as well (Art. 19 DSU). The former have standardized content, namely (Art. 19.1 DSU):
that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.

Suggestions do what their name indicates: they ‘suggest’ specific ways to achieve compliance, e.g. to
bring measures into conformity with the WTO. They are optional, and non-binding. Although
transaction costs could be heavily reduced if followed, WTO Members can lawfully disregard them.
Practice evidences that they have been followed a few times only so far.4
2.2 ABMs (Appellate Body Members)
2.2.1 Nomination
A Preparatory Committee was established (where delegates at the DSB could participate) in order to
decide on the selection process for the members of the AB. Following a recommendation by this body,
the DSB5 decided that an organ be established comprising the DG of the WTO, and the Chairmen of
the General Council, the DSB, the CTG (Council for Trade in Goods), the CTS (Council for Trade in
Services), and the TRIPs (Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights) Council. This organ would be
receiving propositions for nominations by WTO Members and at the end, propose to the DSB its
nominees. It is the DSB that would appoint the members of the AB.6 Individuals are nominated for a
four year term, which is renewable once.
Art. 17.1 DSU states that three rotating members of the AB (a division) will hear a case. The
formula for selection of a division is not reflected in the DSU or in the AB WP (Working Procedures),
and is unknown to the wider public (Rule 6 WP).7 A presiding member for each division will be
selected (Rule 7 WP). Although a division hears and decides a particular case (Rule 3 WP), a practice
of collegiality has developed. In an effort to promote consistency and coherence in decision-making,
Rule 4 WP reflects the so-called collegiality-requirement: according to its § 3, the members of a
division will exchange views with members of the AB who do not participate in their division on the
resolution of the dispute before them. The final decision of course will be taken by the members of the
division alone.

4

5
6
7

Mavroidis and Wu (2012) include a list of suggestions issued during 1995–2012. We discuss the precedential value of
reports infra.
Elsig and Pollack (2014) discuss all this in detail.
WTO Doc. WT/DSB/1 of June 19, 1995.
Anecdotally, it seems that on its appointment, each member of the AB receives a number. A combination of three
numbers, rotating according to a secret formula, will hear appeals as they are coming to the AB. For example, numbers 1,
2 and 5 will hear appeal against DS 1, numbers 2, 6 and 9 will hear appeals against DS2 and so on. What is unknown is
the formula for rotating the divisions.
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2.2.2 Who Gets the Nod?
The following table is a complete list of former and current AB Members up until February 2015
Table 1: Appellate Body Members
Name

Former
Panelist

#Disputes

Nationality

Term of Office

Property

Abi-Saab

28

Egypt

2000–2008

A

Bacchus

34

US

1995–2003

FG/P

Baptista

17

Brazil

2001–2009

P

Bautista

8

Philippines

2007–2011

FG

Beeby

12

New Zealand

1995–2000

FG

Ehlermann

27

EU

1995–2001

FG

El-Naggar

14

Egypt

1995–2000

A/P

Feliciano

25

Philippines

1995–2001

A/FG

Ganesan

25

India

2000–2008

FG

Hillman

13

US

2007–2011

FG

Janow

9

US

2003–2007

A/FG

Yes

Lacarte-Muró

27

Uruguay

1995–2001

FG

Yes

Lockhart

19

Australia

2001–2006

FG/P

Matsushita

16

Japan

1995–2000

A

Oshima

8

Japan

2008–2012

FG

Sacerdoti

24

EU

2001–2009

A

Taniguchi

20

Japan

2000–2007

A

Unterhalter

10

South Africa

2006–2013

P

Graham*

4

US

2011–

FG/P

20

Mexico

2009–

FG

Chang*

7

Korea

2012–

A

Bhatia*

11

India

2011–

FG

Van den Bossche*

11

EU

2009–

A

Zhang*

16

China

2008–

FG

Servansing*

0

Mauritius

2014-

FG

Ramírez-Hernández*

Panelist
after AB

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

*Current AB Members.

A few observations seem warranted:
(a) the preference for former government officials (over 60% of all appointments) is clear and it cuts
across trading partners, in the sense that all of them share this preference;
(b) practitioners and academics are more or less of equal number, and definitely a minority across all
appointments;
(c) fourteen WTO Members have shared all AB members. EU, Japan, and the US have appointed
three each; Egypt, India, and Philippines, two each; Australia, Brazil, China, Korea, Mexico, New
Zealand, South Africa, and Uruguay have appointed one member each;
(d) there has never been an AB term without an EU or US member.
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The typical AB Member is male, with tenure of around 75 months (6 years) with 16 disputes during
that time. Most likely, he/she is a former government official and 60 years of age at the start of the
term of office.
Figure 1: Average number of disputes adjudicated by AB Member.

Total No. of Disputes

35

Disputes per year

4.50
4.00

30
# Disputes

5.00

3.50

25

3.00

20

2.50

15

2.00
1.50

10

1.00

5

0.50

0

0.00

Disputes per year

40

2.2.3 Remuneration
The lack of transparency that we observed with respect to the remuneration of Panelists is evident here
as well. WT/DSB/1, the Decision Establishing the AB cited supra, reads in §12:
The amount of a retainer/fee package would have to be large enough to offset a member’s
opportunity cost of work foregone because of potential conflicts of interest, or incompatibility with
sporadic trips to Geneva. … the compensation should be high enough to provide an incentive for a
member not to take on work which might create a conflict of interest. Accordingly, it would
appear that the retainer should be set at a minimum of SF 7,000 per month, plus a fully-adequate
daily fee, travel expenses and a per diem. The actual amounts should be set on the basis of further
research on current rates for equivalent services under similar conditions.

The wording might suggest that members of the AB will be paid asymmetrically, since the opportunity
cost cannot be the same say for a practicing attorney in a leading law firm, and a mid-level bureaucrat.
In practice though, they are paid the same amount for work done. Work done however, can be
asymmetric for two reasons:
(a) the formula for appointment in a Division is unknown. Empirically however, we know that some
AB members have been appointed more often than others, as our Table 1 shows;
(b) besides the 7,000 Swiss francs per month (which have been adjusted since 1995), AB members
can request compensation for work done at home on any given case. The compensation is fixed at
around 780CHF/day of work. The amount of compensation requested depends on various factors
ranging from the complexity of the case to the personal ethics of individuals involved.

6
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It seems that they are paid on yearly basis more than the stated supra statutory sum, but it is highly
unclear (because of lack of transparency) who gets paid what.8
2.2.4 Function
The AB decides in last resort. It hears appeals against Panel reports (Art. 17.1 DSU), can uphold,
modify or reject appealed Panel findings (Art. 17.13 DSU) and in doing that must be limited to issues
of law (Art. 17.6 DSU). Panels are the trier of facts; the AB cannot revisit facts in order to re-establish
de novo the factual record.
Since its review is based on issues of law–almost by construction–its function is to provide
interpretations of the provisions that could–in principle–apply across cases. There is nothing binding
stare decisis in the WTO legal system. De facto nevertheless, the system comes close to that. In USStainless Steel (Mexico), the AB re-visited all prior case law and held that it expected Panels to follow
prior AB findings dealing with the same issue (§158):
It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the
particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are
free to disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate
Body reports that have been adopted by the DSB. In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate
Body found that:
[a]dopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by
subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore,
should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. (italics in the original)

In US-Shrimp (Article 21.5-Malaysia), the AB clarified that this reasoning applies to adopted AB
reports as well.

3. Support Mechanism: WTO Clerks
3.1 Panel-Stage
Art. 27.1 DSU reads:
The Secretariat shall have the responsibility of assisting panels, especially on the legal, historical
and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with, and of providing secretarial and technical support.

Panels are aided by law clerks. Contrary to the US tradition, clerks are not assigned to individual
judges but to the Panel as such. Law clerks have to pass a competition to this effect and join the WTO.
That is, law clerks’ allegiance is to the WTO, its case law so far etc., and not to particular judges as is
the case for example of clerks to the US Supreme Court.
Practice suggests that–depending on the subject-matter and administrative capacity–different
divisions will assist Panels. Typically, a Legal Officer and a Secretary assist Panels. The Legal Officer
will be a member of the WTO Legal Affairs Division unless the dispute concerns a contingent
protection instrument. In this case, the Legal Affairs Officer will be a member of the WTO Rules
Division. A similar arrangement is in place whenever litigation focuses on trade in services. In such a
case, a member of the WTO GATS Division will act as Legal Officer.

8

WTO Doc. WT/DFA/W/115 mentions in p. 88 that AB expenditure for that year was 624,000 Swiss francs. This sum
exceeds the statutory amount by at least 40,000 Swiss francs. Take into account that this was the budget for 2005. The
budgetary prediction for 2015 is 2,000,000 Swiss francs that have been committed to the AB.
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Secretaries are chosen from the ratione materiae competent Division, e.g. a member of the WTO
Agriculture Division will act as Secretary in cases involving interpretation of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture.
3.2 AB-Stage
The AB as well, has its own Legal Service. The conditions for recruitment are identical to those for the
WTO Secretariat.

4. Black Cat, White Cat
A famous Chinese proverb goes like this:
Black cat, white cat, all that matters is that it gets the mice.

‘Getting the mice’ is a whole new ball game in WTO dispute settlement system. Detailed rules
regarding adjudication have been introduced, the legal framework has expanded exponentially as a
result of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round, and yet the identity of Panelists remains the
same.
This is counter-intuitive to say the least. The amount of case law produced by the WTO is quite
substantial and keeping up with it is a full-time job. Since–as argued above–knowledge of case law is
quintessential—as Panels are expected to follow it— one would expect that Panelists would be well
versed in the intricacies of case law ranging from rules of origin to public health measures to
intellectual property rights. How many members of national delegations can honestly claim expertise
in the field as described above?
We do not know the criteria of the Secretariat for selecting Panelists. Nordström (2005) hints that
the influence of law clerks in drafting reports should not be under-estimated, although recognizes the
limits of the factual record he has established.
As stated above, it is the WTO Secretariat that has the incentive, the legal right indeed to propose
Panelists. It is quite immaterial whether proposed Panelists are members of the roster or not, the right
of the Secretariat is not circumscribed by similar concerns. Indeed, the Secretariat can disregard the
expressed will of WTO Members by proposing non-roster Panelists. It is true that Panelists will not be
appointed unless the parties agree to the proposals. Yet recall that in the lack of agreement it is the
Secretariat again (this time the DG) that chooses who the Panelists in a given dispute will be and this
time, agreement by the parties is not required for an appointment to be made.
WTO Panelists are either unpaid for the service they provide or paid a modest—compared to
market prices in the private sector—honorarium (600CHF/day). The majority of Panelists are
government officials, who do the work for free. The WTO has not put in place any pecuniary incentive
for Panelists that much is for sure.
Think in terms of the opportunity cost as well. Government officials give up on their government
work in order to resolve disputes. It is of course easier for large delegations to ‘take one for the team’
and distribute the work of the missing delegate between them. It is more difficult for smaller
delegations. Horn et al. (2011) provide the numbers showing that delegates from EU, US (the large
delegations) become Panelists about 10% of the time. Delegates from smaller delegations should thus
have even less of an incentive to work as Panelists. And yet, they represent the ‘bulk’ of Panelists.
Why not refuse then? Probably, they do not refuse because the appointment as Panelist is good for
their career development. The best of both worlds for them is to accept nominations while
‘outsourcing’ the work associated with the nomination.

8

Black Cat, White Cat. The Identity of the WTO Judges

Consistency—assuming one is not consistently incorrect—is an incentive compatible structure for
any adjudicating forum, since this is the best proxy for ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’. For
consistency to be thus served, expertise is necessary input. Expertise nevertheless, should not be taken
for granted and it is more likely that it resides with members of the WTO Secretariat than with
‘amateur’ judges.
In ‘The Go-Between’, L.P. Hartley’s 1953 classic novel, the past is likened to a foreign country;
‘they do things differently there’. When it comes to adjudication, the past is close to the Holy Grail.
There are of course good arguments in favour of constant rotation of judges such as abating
institutional bias. But there are equally good arguments in favour of consistency, although consistency
is not a value per se. The key to the past is in the hands of the WTO Secretariat and not in the hands of
one- or two time Panelists, as the majority of them are.9 The quest to be consistent will be highly aided
by those who are not prepared to question the past, and this is an area where government officials have
comparative advantage over doubting academics.
Taking all this on board would suggest that the interests of amateur judges are best served when:
(a) They can pride themselves that they have served as Panelists;
(b) Panel time has not been too much of a distraction from their day to day occupation;
(c) They have ‘outsourced’ the work associated with the preparation of the ‘issues paper’ that serves
as basis for Panel deliberations, the drafting of award, the consistency of the award with prior
rulings on the same issue to those with the expertise to do a good job, e.g. the members of the
WTO Secretariat.
The situation is probably a bit different with respect to members of the AB. Much of our discussion
supra nevertheless, finds application there as well. All this to suggest that, while the Secretariat has no
authority to interpret the various provisions in the WTO Agreement and should serve rather than lead
the Panel, there are good arguments to suggest that the line between ‘serve’ and ‘lead’ is more a line in
the sand rather than set in stone.
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